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Question 
What economic interventions or tools supported by international actors, including international 
financial institutions, have delivered short-term stability to manage popular unrest between 
protestors and the state? 
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The main finding of this review is that there is almost no literature directly answering the 
specific question posed, i.e. on the effectiveness of economic interventions supported by 
international actors in delivering short-term stability in the face of popular unrest. We examine 
closely related research on two important factors associated with recent unrest – food and fuel 
prices – and the effectiveness of various policy responses. Another section reviews evidence on 
the response to unrest generally favoured by international actors, the provision of targeted social 
assistance, and a final section contextualises the issues with geographic case studies. Overall, the 
literature reviewed here suggests that economic policy responses to unrest should be ‘politically 
smart’, addressing not only the short-term triggers of protest, but also the underlying grievances 
held by disenfranchised and marginalised groups that are more likely to mobilise.  
There have been a large number of studies on the political economy of energy subsidy reform 
and food prices, which were associated with significant popular unrest in recent years. Neither of 
these literatures has an analytical focus on the effectiveness of policy responses at bringing 
stability. Research on energy subsidies centres on optimal design of reform strategies to minimise 
unrest before it happens (Inchauste and Victor, 2017), while studies of food price shocks tend to 
focus on the effectiveness of economic policy responses in reducing price volatility or poverty 
levels (FAO et al., 2011). Nevertheless, relevant findings include: 
 Where policy changes have triggered unrest, reversing those changes (e.g. by reinstating 
subsidies) may not deliver stability, as issue-specific protests often become connected to 
broader mobilisations challenging regime legitimacy (Hossain et al., 2018). 
 Policy reforms liable to provoke unrest should be carefully designed to compensate 
powerful groups that stand to lose out as far as possible (Lockwood, 2015) and should be 
accompanied by effective communication strategies (Alleyne, 2013). 
In cases of social unrest, the preferred response of international actors is generally the 
provision of targeted social assistance (IMF, 2008). We review evidence on cash transfers and 
public works programmes in particular, but these are rarely evaluated in terms of their impact on 
short-term stability. In any case, effective implementation requires specific governance capabilities 
of state actors, as well as having systems in place before unrest occurs. This points to the need 
for international actors to support governments in developing effective social safety nets in the 
medium-long term that can be quickly scaled up in response to crises. Other findings include: 
 Evaluations of cash transfer programmes focus on poverty outcomes among recipients, 
which are generally improved (Bastagli et al., 2016). 
 Initial findings from ongoing research on public works programmes suggest they do not 
have a significant impact on social stability (Mvukiyehe, 2018).  
 Cash transfers targeting the poorest may not be effective at reducing unrest because 
members of the middle class and political oppositions are also likely to protest (Berazneva 
and Lee, 2013). 
 Although higher levels of social expenditure reduce unrest over the medium term (Justino, 
2015), in the short-term the targeting of cash transfer programmes may be perceived as 
divisive and provoke further unrest, as in the case of Indonesia (Inchauste & Victor, 2017). 
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This report includes three geographic case studies that provide further insights. Key findings 
include: 
 The diversity of social stability outcomes in the Arab World, in response to similar food 
price shocks and with apparently similar policy responses, shows the need for context-
specific analysis, addressing underlying vulnerabilities, dealing with corruption, effective 
communication campaigns and politically savvy leaders (Harrigan, 2014; Barany, 2013). 
 In Indonesia, the long history of energy subsidy reform and social unrest was 
characterised by policy reversal and developing redistributive systems, suggesting the 
need to support government implementation capabilities and accept ‘second best’ policy 
options (Lockwood, 2015). 
 The Indian case shows that redistributive transfers can successfully mitigate social unrest. 
However, this functions through addressing the underlying causes over the medium-term, 
rather than acting as a short-term response (Justino, 2015). 
2. Background: social unrest and economic responses 
Popular protests can be viewed as forms of mobilisation which demonstrate the ‘holding power’ of 
a political movement. They aim at bringing about changes in the institutions and policies that 
distribute economic resources between actors, in order to reshape the ‘political settlement’ (Khan, 
2018). In this framework, the types of response to unrest that can deliver short-term stability will 
depend on the nature of grievances, but also crucially the extent to which protests are part of a 
political movement that fundamentally changes the distribution of power in society. 
Ortiz et al. (2013) provide a helpful overview of the main grievances held by protest movements. 
They examine 843 protests worldwide from 2006-13 and identify four main categories of grievance; 
the most common being ‘economic justice and anti-austerity’ (including jobs, wages, food and fuel 
prices, etc.), followed by ‘failure of political representation and political systems’ (e.g. corruption, 
democracy, etc.), ‘global justice issues’ (e.g. relating to trade, the environment etc.) and ‘rights of 
people’ (e.g. indigenous, ethnic, sexual and religious groups). In 2019 alone a range of countries 
(e.g. Haiti, Chile, Ecuador, Lebanon, Iraq, Hong Kong, UK, France) experienced major popular 
unrest related to interconnected economic and political grievances, among them public services, 
economic stagnation, political freedom, fuel subsidy reform and climate change (Raymond, 2019). 
The diversity of grievances and political economy contexts of protest movements worldwide means 
that policy responses are varied. Responses commonly include reinstatement of or increases in 
subsidies to consumption (e.g. food, fuel); increased social assistance (e.g. targeted cash 
transfers); public works programmes; reducing taxes and tariffs (e.g. on staple foods); increasing 
minimum wages and public sector salaries; introducing small business loan schemes; and, 
exchange rate flexibility. (Harrigan, 2014; Hossain et al., 2018; IMF 2008). There is no research 
specifically addressing the effectiveness of these measures at managing short-term unrest. 
Research by political scientists on protests and policy responses often focuses on the extent to 
which protest movements achieve their desired policy outcomes. For example, Silva (2015) 
documents the success of various Latin American protest movements in bringing about policy 
change including Argentina’s piqueteros, Chile’s students and indigenous groups in Bolivia and 
Ecuador. However, like most such studies there is little attention to the effectiveness of responses 
in terms of impacts on stability. 
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Literature on international actors and protest tends to focus on how policy reforms that are required 
by international financial institutions (IFIs) as part of financial assistance packages (e.g. Structural 
Adjustment Programs - SAPs) have been a key driver of unrest in many countries. This has 
resulted in the “IMF riots” moniker (Hossain et al, 2018). While IFIs tend not to work directly on 
policies aimed at reducing civil unrest per se, their main recommendation in cases of unrest - e.g. 
related to food and fuel prices - is often targeted cash transfers (IMF, 2008).  
In this report we focus on IFIs since they tend to support a more clearly defined set of policies, 
while other international actors, e.g. bilateral donors and diplomatic corps, have more diverse and 
eclectic approaches. 
3. Recent unrest: the politics of provision 
Energy 
In recent years, protests over energy prices have proliferated in the global North and South, 
particularly in response to state efforts to reduce subsidies for fossil fuels in pursuit of objectives 
around fiscal consolidation, the climate emergency and inequality (as blanket subsidies are 
regressive). Most of the policy literature focuses on how energy subsidy reform can be designed 
ex ante so as to minimise unrest, but there is some attention to ex post policy responses to 
protests. 
Hossain et al.’s (2018) study found that reinstating fuel subsidies did not quell unrest. In 
Myanmar (2007), Egypt (2008-13), Mozambique (2008-10) and Nigeria (2012), cuts in fuel 
subsidies led to protests. In all cases a key policy response was the reinstatement of subsidies, at 
least in part, but only temporarily in most cases (Hossain et al., 2018: 18-19). Subsidy 
reinstatement did not stop unrest because in all of these cases energy protests underwent a ‘scale-
shift’, i.e. transformed from a specific grievance around fuel prices to part of a broader political 
challenge to state authority.  
These processes culminated in the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in Myanmar and the 2011 uprising in 
Egypt. In Nigeria and Mozambique, the energy protests were connected to broader mobilisations 
around corruption and debt respectively, but Nigerian fuel subsidies were later withdrawn under 
an IMF reform package. Across the cases, fuel price changes were triggers but the protests arose 
for myriad social, political and economic reasons (Hossain et al., 2018). Consequently, policy 
responses must also address underlying drivers, and simply reverting to the previous policy status 
quo is not sufficient to resolve grievances (Hossain et al, 2018). 
The key recommendation by researchers and IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF for 
successful energy subsidy reduction is to minimise unrest by designing reforms to 
compensate losing groups through so called ‘hybrid’ strategies, accompanied by effective 
communication with the public (Lockwood, 2015; Inchauste & Victor, 2017; Alleyne, 2013). A 
main element of this is enhancing social protection systems, but this is acknowledged by IFIs to 
be a long-term process requiring the development of administrative and technical capabilities by 
implementing governments (Inchauste & Victor, 2017; Alleyne, 2013). In any case, compensating 
safety nets for the poor are unlikely to reduce unrest if they do not address the politics underlying 
the original energy subsidies (Lockwood, 2015). 
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Food 
Protests occurred in a large number of countries in 2008 and 2011 following sharp increases in 
the prices of international agricultural commodities which passed through to domestic food 
markets. Hossain and Scott-Villiers (2017) find that protests targeted national state authorities 
despite the global market origins of price rises because of the ‘common sense’ right to food. 
Policy responses to both price volatility and the resulting unrest were largely ad hoc in 
nature and often inconsistent with other national and international policies (FAO et al., 
2011). Demeke et al. (2008) identify market and trade policy measures as the most prominent 
response, particularly: 
 reductions in tariffs or custom fees (43 of 81 developing countries surveyed) 
 selling grain from public stocks or imports at subsidised prices (35) 
 restrictions or bans on exports (25) 
 suspension or reduction of VAT and other taxes (23) 
 price controls (e.g. maximum prices, hoarding penalties) (21).  
Social assistance was also an area of strong policy response, especially: 
 cash transfers (23) 
 food assistance (food aid, vouchers, school feeding) (19) 
 measures to increase disposable incomes (e.g. public works programmes, increasing 
public sector wages) (16).  
Finally, short-term measures to support agricultural production were introduced including:  
 production support programmes (35) 
 productive safety nets (15) 
 fertiliser and seed programmes (9) 
 market based interventions (15). 
The tightening of monetary policy to reduce inflationary pressures, and exchange rate appreciation 
to make food imports cheaper, were also observed (IMF, 2008). Research has mainly focused on 
the effectiveness of these responses at stabilising food prices and reducing poverty rather than 
their impact on unrest (FAO et al., 2011).  
IFIs discourage responses to food price protests that compromise the efficiency of markets 
by suppressing the transfer of price signals to producers, since this will reduce the extent 
of the supply response (IMF, 2008). Measures requiring overall public expenditure increases, 
such as universal subsidies, are also discouraged in developing countries where fiscal space is 
limited. Targeted social transfers are preferred by IFIs since the targeting reduces fiscal outlay, 
and by operating outside market mechanisms, price signals are retained. However, since targeted 
transfers require strong planning and implementation capabilities by states, and in the face of 
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market distorting measures by other countries, IFIs do show flexibility, recently supporting the 
implementation of Bangladesh’s food stock system.1 
4. IFI approved responses: targeted social assistance 
Social protection systems have historically emerged and evolved as part of long-term processes 
of societal conflict arising from the growth of market-based economies (Polanyi, ([1944] 2001). 
This is not only because the provision of social safety nets to a majority of the population requires 
significant resources, but also the enforcement of rights to social assistance is premised on a 
broad-based distribution of power which tends to occur only after a certain level of development is 
reached (Khan, 2018). 
Research has confirmed that policymakers direct social assistance to groups more likely 
to protest, in order to pacify them (Yörük et al., 2017). Cross-country studies provide an 
empirical basis for this strategy, finding an inverse relationship between levels of welfare spending 
and civil conflict, i.e. higher levels of social expenditure reduce the likelihood of conflict (Taydas 
and Peksen, 2012). The outcomes of specific contexts and social expenditure types may not reflect 
this general trend, however, with Blattman et al. (2014) finding that receipt of a business grant did 
not affect social cohesion or protest outcomes in Uganda. 
Targeted cash transfers 
Cash transfers arose in Latin America as a solution to the social cost of structural adjustment, and 
they remain the preferred form of short-term social assistance to address unrest for IFIs (Nelson 
and Sandberg, 2017). However, evaluations of cash transfer programmes overwhelmingly focus 
on their impact on economic outcomes such as poverty rather than stability or unrest (Bastagli et 
al., 2016).  
Evidence is limited and mixed on the impact of cash transfers on social cohesion, with the 
potential to address the vulnerability of marginalised groups offset by the social division 
inherent in targeting (Idris, 2017). One of the few studies (Justino, 2015) to examine the 
relationship between social transfers and unrest directly notes that “we have little understanding 
of what generates civil unrest and what can be done to prevent or reduce it”. However, the results 
from Indian states suggest that “in the medium term, redistributive transfers are a successful tool 
for reducing social conflict” (Justino, 2015: 19). Importantly, Justino’s (2015) study looks at social 
expenditure and unrest on a preventative basis, i.e. does not assess its effectiveness in responding 
to protests. 
A key question for the targeted transfer programmes advocated by IFIs is who to target. In the 
case of appropriate responses to economic shocks, there is a strong case that the poorest should 
be targeted, since they are invariably the most vulnerable. However, in the case of unrest, evidence 
suggests that protesters are not the poorest of the poor. Protests in countries across Africa at rising 
food prices in 2007-2008 attended in many cases by members of the middle class and political 
oppositions (Berazneva & Lee, 2013). 
                                                   
1 "Bangladesh Modern Food Storage Facilities Project: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/project-detail/P120583".  
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As mentioned above, effective cash transfer programmes require a relatively high level of 
government administrative capability and ideally would be in place before unrest occurred, at which 
point they can be scaled up (Inchauste & Victor, 2017). Although in principle popular unrest could 
be a catalyst for the initiation of a cash transfer programme, the accompanying atmosphere of 
mistrust between protesters and the state may not be conducive.  
Public works programmes 
Another form of social assistance favoured by IFIs to address unrest, albeit more often in post-
conflict situations rather than civil unrest, is public works initiatives. These are also known as ‘cash 
for work’ (CFW) and ‘labour-intensive public works’ (LIPW), and provide temporary work to 
vulnerable groups to build community assets (Subbarao et al., 2013).  
Evidence is mixed on the effectiveness of public works programmes at reducing instability. 
They are often introduced or scaled-up following crises, suggesting their suitability for responding 
to short-term shocks. Subbarao et al. (2013) point to successful outcomes in post-conflict and 
fragile settings (e.g. in Rwanda and Sri Lanka), where rural populations depend on agriculture 
subject to weather shocks and seasonal variation (e.g. the well-known Indian Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, MGNREGS), and after natural disasters (e.g. in 
Bangladesh). However initial findings from recent World Bank research, involving Randomised 
Control Trials (RCTs) of LIPW programmes targeting around 40,000 households in six African 
countries, suggest little evidence that LIPW programmes have a significant impact on violence and 
social stability (Mvukiyehe, 2018). 
One challenge for the use of public works programmes during periods of popular unrest is that 
they are usually self-selecting. Where protesters are mainly motivated by economic factors such 
as the cost of living this may not be a problem, but if political grievances are present as well 
protesters may be reluctant to engage. 
5. Geographic case studies 
Arab World 
Causes of unrest 
To varying degrees across the Arab World, food insecurity has been a major factor in civil unrest. 
This topic and state responses is the focus of Harrigan’s (2014) work, which is often cited in the 
related literature. The region is particularly vulnerable because it is a high net food importer 
(Harrigan, 2014: 4). In 2007-2008, and 2010-2011, global food prices soared, reaching an all-time 
high in February 2011. In the Arab World this resulted in trade and fiscal deficits, increased 
inflation, increased poverty and nutritional problems among the poor and middle-class, and 
accompanying protests (Harrigan 2014: 6).  
Although the so-called Arab Spring “was first and foremost a political movement to remove 
oppressive undemocratic regimes”, food problems were part of the movement’s socio-economic 
underpinnings (Harrigan, 2014: 6). Such issues were one element of the unravelling of the implicit 
social contract between many Arab regimes and their peoples, which had previously offered cheap 
subsidised food, housing, and utilities. IMF-encouraged liberalisation from the 1970s also played 
a significant part in the undoing of this safety net (Harrigan, 2014: 105). 
8 
Interventions  
Short-term responses in the 2000s to these issues included (Harrigan, 2014:115-118): 
 increasing public sector wages; 
 increasing government expenditure on bread and other food subsidies; 
 providing free staple food handouts;  
 reducing tariffs on imported food items;  
 increasing direct cash transfers to the poor; 
 reduction or abolition of import taxes and tariffs; 
 introducing new taxes and restrictions on certain food exports; 
 switching to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
Except for targeted cash transfers to the poor these measures are largely not supported by IFIs 
(IMF 2008), and appear to take aim more at the short-term effects of food insecurity rather than 
the root causes of the vulnerability to global food price shocks in the Arab World. 
However, another supranational organization – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – did make 
economic and political interventions both within their member states and externally (Barany, 2013). 
For example, the GCC made loans to Oman in 2011. The GCC also raised the possibility of 
membership with both Jordan and Morocco as a way of shoring up the ruling administrations’ 
popularity during the period of mass mobilizations. (GCC membership would bring extensive trade 
and development advantages) Ultimately this extension of membership did not materialize.  
Stability effect and lessons 
Harrigan (2014) does not set out to give an assessment of these responses’ impact on short-term 
stability but points to examples in the Arab World of countries that retained stability through 2011 
(such as Jordan), as well as those that went in the opposite direction (such as Syria). Like most 
such studies, the focus is on the impact of policy responses on poverty. A main finding is that, 
although designed to reduce the impact of rising food prices, these responses did not always help 
the poorest. This is partly because of the short-term nature of policy responses and resulting failure 
to address underlying causes and vulnerabilities, as well as corruption diverting resources from 
intended beneficiaries, such as in Lebanon (Harrigan, 2014: 120-121).  
Barany (2013: 26) emphasises the key importance of effective communication campaigns in 
tandem with the short-term economic measures, citing the Jordanian and Moroccan cases. Barany 
highlights how astute political manoeuvring by kings Abdullah II and Mohammad V were also a 
major contributor to forestalling and cooling unrest. 
There are few lessons from the literature on the effectiveness of different economic short-term 
responses, because the focus is on the importance of long-term reform strategies. Harrigan (2014: 
123-5) comments that IFI advice to Arab governments is becoming more nuanced, shifting from a 
solely trade-based approach to food security to more of an emphasis on domestic food production2. 
Like many such studies of crises in the region, Mossallam (2015) concludes that IFIs should 
                                                   
2 Gulf states are also increasingly buying land abroad to secure food provision, known as the ‘land grab’ 
phenomenon (Harrigan, 2014) 
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support the development of social protection schemes that are very closely tailored to national 
contexts in order to reduce vulnerability to shocks. 
Indonesia 
Causes of unrest 
Attempts at fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia have been a factor in civil unrest since the 1970s, 
often provoking mobilised responses from the poor and ‘nearly poor’ (Lockwood, 2015). The latter 
group, bunched just above the poverty line, are both highly vulnerable to price shocks and capable 
of large-scale mobilisation. Fuel subsidies were an important way in which the Suharto regime 
(1968-1998) built its power base, and protests at attempted reform were a major cause of Suharto’s 
departure alongside foreign direct investment flight and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Subsidy reform attempts since the Crisis until 2017 included “six ad hoc price increases, three ad 
hoc price decreases, and two periods when prices have been subject to frequent formula-
determined adjustments” (Inchauste & Victor, 2017:133). 
Interventions 
Since 1998 a twin pattern has emerged in state responses to fuel subsidy protest, involving a 
mixture of (a) alternative redistribution tools and (b) policy reversal. For instance, following the 
departure of Suharto, the Wahid administration (1999-2001) abandoned reforms that led to 
protests, instead increasing fuel subsidies significantly. In addition, it also developed alternative 
redistribution tools including cash transfers, funding for schools and village infrastructure, and 
health insurance for some households (Lockwood, 2015: 487), which may have pre-empted unrest. 
In addition, a pricing formula for fuel (50% of market price) was introduced in 2001, but abandoned 
after protests in 2003 (Inchauste & Victor, 2017:153).  
The Yudhoyuno administration’s (2004-2014) fuel price reform in 2005 was accompanied by 
support for education, health and social welfare, transportation, clean water infrastructure, small 
enterprises, empowerment of coastal communities, and cash transfers known as ‘BLT’ (Inchauste 
& Victor, 2017:154-157). This too was accompanied by substantial protest, partly on the basis of 
the complaint that the delivery of BLT was corrupt and politicised. 
Stability effect and lessons 
The pursuit of fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia has not been smooth, provoking large-scale 
protests, requiring policy reversals and re-attempts. It appears that reversing subsidy reductions 
appeased protestors, however it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of pre-emptive measures 
at forestalling protests. Inchauste & Victor (2017:153) emphasise the importance of careful 
preparation of alternative distribution tools, although they argue that the successes made in 2005 
were also down to shrewd political planning and good communication.  
Indonesia offers an instance of a cash transfer scheme both provoking unrest, because of 
perceptions of unfairness in its targeting, as well as contributing to stability (Inchauste & Victor 
(2017:157). This demonstrates the challenges of moving away from blanket subsidies to targeted 
safety measures when state capacities to deliver the latter effectively are weak, while avoiding 
alienating politically mobilised groups. For this reason, Lockwood (2015:487) argues that, in lieu 
of the international community’s preferred intervention (the targeted safety net), it is sometimes 
worth considering the ‘second best option’, such as replacing one subsidy category with another, 
e.g. fuel for food, even though the latter also comes with disadvantages. 
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India 
Causes of unrest 
Justino (2015) examines the impact of expenditure on social services in mitigating and preventing 
unrest in India between 1960 and 2011 across 16 states. The causes of unrest are varied, including 
separatism, inter-caste tension, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict, alongside disparities in 
employment and working conditions, access to land, access to social services, legal institutions, 
and the ability to wield power (Justino, 2015: 9). 
Interventions, stability effect and lessons 
Government spending on social services mainly targets the socio-economic causes of the unrest 
rather than those related to religious, cultural and caste identities – despite the fact that these are 
not entirely separable. Redistributive transfers in particular address distributional concerns, and 
may have been a factor contributing to the relative lack of civil conflict in India (Justino, 2015: 19).  
Importantly, Justino (2015) finds that the short-term effect of social expenditure – i.e. the impact 
on stabilising unrest – is negligible. It is only in the medium-term that beneficial effects occur. 
Justino (2015) suggests this is because of the time required for social spending to impact poverty 
and inequality: the drivers of social discontent. 
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